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What explains variation in infl ation rates across time and countries? The conventional wisdom in the political economy literature emphasises the role of ideas and institutions. A new dominant economic narrative convinced policy makers that pursuing low infl ation was essentially a "free lunch": any monetary-induced employment gains would resorb over the long run while infl ation would be higher. 1 Many governments opted to delegate monetary policy to independent and conservative central banks to ensure that they would resist the temptation to enact policies that would result in long-term increases in infl ation for short-term gains. By tying their hands, this ensured that the government's commitment to low infl ation was "credible".
2 Countries in which employers and employees coordinate their wage bargaining were better able to anticipate that the central bank would punish excessive wage claims, thereby further moderating infl ation.
While valuable, these explanations suffer from two problems. Empirically, it is not clear why countries with similar dominant ideas and institutions should continue to exhibit different infl ation rates. In 1998, for instance, Greece and Germany had very similar levels of central bank independence, 0.89 and 0.92 respectively based on the index de- 
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Why do different countries exhibit different infl ation rates? Most political economy accounts emphasise the role of ideas and institutions: as economic research shows that low infl ation is achievable at no economic cost, governments delegate monetary policy to independent central banks. Countries with independent central banks and unions that anticipate the consequences of their actions by coordinating wage bargaining in turn achieve lower infl ation. This conventional wisdom downplays the importance of interests, ignoring the signifi cant infl uence that a growing electoral group -the elderly -has on infl ation. Because the elderly are politically powerful and infl ation averse, countries with more elderly citizens force political parties to adopt more economically orthodox policies when in power, resulting in lower infl ation rates in those countries. Ageing populations may therefore lock in a low infl ation regime, even when this is not economically desirable.
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Monetary Policy problem is that the variation among institutions -in this case central bank independence -and infl ation rates does not suggest a very strong correlation. Thus, for instance, Figure 1 shows that in 1998 -i.e. before the European Central Bank took over monetary policy responsibility from national central banks in eurozone countries -many subsequent EMU members had fairly similar degrees of central bank independence but nevertheless exhibited infl ation rate differences of several percentage points. Conversely, countries with various degrees of central bank independence had fairly similar infl ation rates. Consistent with this snapshot, the bivariate correlation coeffi cient between infl ation and central bank independence in a sample of 21 OECD countries since 1960 is negative and signifi cant (at the one per cent level) but not particularly large (-0.16).
Moreover, we would expect that countries with sizeable export sectors and well-coordinated wage bargaining have both the ability and willingness to keep infl ation low to retain their competitive advantage in trade. Figure 2 displays the relationship between infl ation and wage coordination in 1998. 10 We can see that countries with similar wage coordination rankings have vastly different infl ation The scale ranges from 1 (minimum wage coordination) to 5 (maximum wage coordination). We use 1998 data because the euro may have introduced polarizing infl ation dynamics within the eurozone.
Keynesian policy paradigm towards monetarism. 5 As a result, in order to prevent policy makers from pursuing policies for short-term electoral gains that may have adverse infl ationary consequences, governments agreed to tie their hands by delegating monetary policy to independent central banks. 6 This had the added benefi ts of convincing all actors that the commitment to low infl ation was credible.
7 Thus, for instance, joining the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) raised the political costs of infl ation because governments' low infl ation commitments would be closely monitored. The problem with this ideational approach is what it leaves unanswered, namely whose ideas dominate policy making and why?
A second approach has focused instead on the role of domestic institutions, and in particular of independent central banks. Because central banks generally prefer lower rates of infl ation than elected governments do, independence should lead to lower infl ation. 8 However, the effect of independent central banks on infl ation is contingent on the institutional environment in which employees and employers bargain wages. In countries with highly coordinated wage bargaining, unions would internalise the adverse infl ationary effects of their wage claims and the negative employment consequences that would follow if the monetary policy authority responded by raising interest rates. As a result, unions in highly coordinated systems should behave in a way that would lead to low infl ation even in the absence of a conservative policy response by the central bank.
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One problem with this literature is that it is diffi cult to explain which idea prevails without examing the prevailing political context. This is not to say that ideas are not important, but rather to point out that governments are unlikely to completely ignore the preferences of the electorate when choosing which economic institutions to adopt. Another 
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Stronger fi nancial actors infl uence governments either through the discipline of capital markets or by lobbying them. While such fi ndings are interesting, the focus of this literature is primarily on interest groups.
In what follows, it is explored how electoral politics may also play a role. To the extent that left-wing and right-wing parties have constituents that are differently affected by infl ation, the ideology of the governing party should infl uence infl ation. Earlier work by Hibbs indeed suggests that left-wing constituents are less infl ation averse and that, as a result, countries with left-wing governments will exhibit higher infl ation rates.
12 While valuable, this perspective ignores changes in the electorate that affect both left-wing and right-wing political parties, which is what this paper explores by focusing on the elderly.
In the last decades, most advanced industrialised democracies have experienced a major change in the demographic composition of their electorate. The old age dependency ratio in Europe, i.e. the ratio of those 65 and older over those between 15 and 64, increased from 12.5% in 1950 to 23.8% in 2010. Almost 20% of the population in the euro area was above 65, and fi ve per cent above 80, in 2010. 13 As Figure 3 shows, the share of the outcomes (e.g. Japan, Austria, Sweden, Norway and Ireland), while countries with similar infl ation levels (e.g. Finland and the UK, or Japan and France) had different wage coordination rankings. The correlation coeffi cient between infl ation and wage coordination in a sample of 21 OECD countries since 1960 is -0.0187 (non-signifi cant p-value of 0.5435).
The impact of trade openness is similarly mixed: in 1998, France and Australia had lower infl ation rates than Ireland and the Netherlands despite having much lower levels of trade openness. Belgium and Australia had almost identical infl ation rates despite the more than 40 percentage point difference in their export-to-GDP ratios. The correlation coeffi cient between infl ation and trade openness in a sample of 21 OECD countries since 1960 is -0.1450 (signifi cant p-value of 0.000).
Bringing interests back in: the case of the elderly
In arguing that interests matter more than is suggested in ideational and institutional literature, this paper builds on previous interest-based accounts. Posen has shown that because the fi nancial sector is infl ation averse, governments in countries with more powerful fi nancial actors tend to attribute more importance to price stability and therefore opt for more independent central banks. Monetary Policy same period. 18 Specifi cally, a variable labelled "Economic Orthodoxy" (per414) measures whether the party manifesto emphasises "support for a strong currency", "reduction of budget defi cits" and "thrift and savings in the face of economic hardship". Figure 4 plots economic orthodoxy and average infl ation aversion in each decade for all countries for which data is available. Because we expect infl ation aversion to feed into party position only slowly, infl ation aversion is represented in the decade prior to the decade of the average party economic orthodoxy. Consistent with the argument that political parties internalise infl ation aversion over time, there is a positive relationship between the electorate's infl ation aversion and party orthodoxy. As is shown elsewhere, a more formal statistical analysis confi rms that the share of the elderly population is positively associated with party orthodoxy when controlling for relevant economic controls. 19 What are the implications for infl ation rates? Figure 5 examines the relationship between infl ation rates and the share of the elderly in the population in 2000. It reveals a much stronger negative relationship than for central bank independence and wage coordination. This is confi rmed by the bivariate correlation coeffi cient between infl ation and the share of elderly in a sample of 21 OECD countries since 1960, which is -0.2797 (signifi cant p-value of 0.000). As I show elsewhere, a more formal statistical analysis on a sample of 21 OECD countries in the period 1960-2012 confi rms that the share of elderly is negatively associated with the infl ation rate when controlling for all relevant controls, including GDP growth, unemployment, wage coordination, trade openness, union density, welfare state spending and control of the government by the political left.
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Responding to possible criticisms
One criticism of this approach could be that the elderly may not be a coherent group with clearly infl ation-averse tendencies. However, the elderly are much more likely to own their houses, to rely on pensions and not to be in the labour market. These are very important factors infl uencing preferences, and other political economy research has shown that small individual characteristics, such as the type of employment contract, affect policy preferences. 21 There is also clear em-elderly since 1960 in the OECD has increased by more than seven percentage points.
This growing share of the elderly is important, because the elderly may have a lower tolerance for infl ation since they rely to a greater extent on fi xed income streams that are not protected from infl ation. As many countries have reduced the generosity of their defi ned benefi t pension schemes, the elderly increasingly rely on defi ned contribution schemes and income from assets, which are much less protected from high infl ation.
A recent study of aversion to infl ation using cross-national survey data fi nds evidence that corroborates this point.
Older individuals are more infl ation averse because they "are more likely to have signifi cant nominal assets and/or to rely on fi xed incomes". 14 These results hold when controlling for labour market status, ideology, education and income quartile and including country effects.
The elderly are not only more infl ation averse, they are also more politically powerful than many other electoral groups. Older people are more likely to vote 15 and are much more likely to be members of political parties. 16 As their numbers increase and voter turnout falls, they represent an increasingly important electoral group for all political parties, which therefore are incentivised to pursue a platform of lower infl ation.
Ageing brings infl ation down
Growing infl ation aversion among parts of the electorate has important implications for the policies that political parties choose to pursue. The Eurobarometer survey has asked respondents in all European countries since the 1970s whether they identify infl ation as their fi rst or second priority, 17 which makes it possible to calculate the percentage of the population that is concerned about infl ation. This could therefore serve as a proxy for infl ation aversion. We can expect that a shift in the electorate's preferences for low infl ation will -over time and slowly -be refl ected in the policy positions of political parties. It is in turn possible to investigate whether political parties become more infl ation averse using the systematic coding of party manifestos in different countries in the A fi nal possible criticism may be that it is not clear how political parties affect infl ation once in power, especially in a context in which central banks are independent. There are several responses to this criticism. First, ageing may itself make it more likely that governments delegate monetary policy to independent central banks and this is indeed what I fi nd. Second, the independence of central banks needs to be politically sustained over the long run. Third, governments may infl uence infl ation rates not only through monetary policy but also through fi scal policy, energy policy, industrial policy and by infl uencing wage moderation (for example through a higher minimum wage, the extension of wage bargaining agreements or by altering the reservation wage of different workers through welfare state policies).
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Concluding comments
In this article the case is made for a greater consideration of how electoral politics may shape macroeconomic policy through the example of the effect of the share of elderly on infl ation. While institutions and ideas certainly play a role in explaining infl ation, I argue that there is scope for including the role of interests in the analysis. Because the elderly are infl ation averse and politically powerful, political parties in countries with more elderly people are increasingly forced to adopt more economically orthodox policies that ultimately lead to lower infl ation.
If this is correct, ageing may be a -so far missing -piece of the puzzle as to why there has been such a consistent and stable shift away from Keynesianism and towards a low infl ation monetarist compromise. As societies age, a growing share of the population starts to worry primarily about infl ation rather than employment. Consequently, the electoral cost of neglecting stagnant labour markets while prioritising low infl ation rates may fall as countries age.
This political economy account may also help explain why low infl ation -and the monetarist ideology that underpins it -continues to prevail, even in a context in which higher infl ation rates would be desirable, given the macroeconomic problems that the eurozone faces. Rather than explaining Germany's focus on low infl ation and an austere macroeconomic policy solely through culture or the interests of its export sector, this analytical framework would stress the political power of the growing share of the elderly in the German electoral system.
Further research should therefore extend the analysis of the electoral determinants of infl ation rates by considering other powerful political groups among the workforce. The changing infl ation preferences of a coalition of various electoral groups may help explain the shift to monetarism in most industrialised democracies. pirical evidence that the elderly are more infl ation averse, and this effect holds not just in the 2000s, which could capture a generational rather than life cycle effect, but also in the late 1970s and 1980s.
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A second potential criticism is that the relationship between infl ation and the elderly operates through an economic rather than a political channel. The elderly may exhibit different consumption behaviour that would in turn feed into lower infl ation rates. However, if this were true, the relationship between infl ation and ageing would hold in both democracies and non-democracies. Yet, this is not the case: the share of the elderly is only negatively associated in democracies, whereas the effect is not statistically signifi cant in non-democracies.
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A third possible criticism is that ageing and infl ation are both heavily trended so that the relationship between the two is spurious. However, taking the fi rst difference of infl ation or running an error correction model that corrects such risks does not affect the results. If we only analyse the cross-national relationship between infl ation and the share of elderly at one point in time, rather than over time, the results still hold.
A fourth possible criticism is that this analysis overplays the political importance of the elderly. However, it is not clear that political parties can afford to systematically ignore an electoral group that represents as much as 20% of the population in some countries -especially when voter turnout can sometimes be as low as 60%. The 65-year-old cut-off point used in this analysis may underplay the importance of the elderly, since those 50 and older may be forward-looking and anticipate their interests in the near future. This would significantly increase the political salience of ageing.
Another potential criticism is that ageing occurs when societies modernise and that more developed countries exhibit both low infl ation and large elderly populations. However, if this captured the dynamics at play, we should expect that controlling for GDP per capita and including non-OECD countries in the statistical analysis would wipe out the statistical signifi cance of the share of elderly because of the presumed relationship between GDP per capita and ageing in the aforementioned "modernisation thesis". Yet this is not the case: running the same analysis on a sample of more than 100 countries shows that the effect remains statistically signifi cant both when controlling for GDP per capita as well as when excluding all countries with GDP per capita above $20,000.
